Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitive Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite by Breckenridge, Jonathan T. et al.
www.nasa.gov/sls
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
www.nasa.gov/sls
S
p
a
c
e
 
L
a
u
n
c
h
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
Application of Fault 
Management Theory to the 
Quantitative Selection of a 
Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger 
Suite
Dr. Yunnhon (Yohon )Lo, Jacobs ESSSA Group, Ducommun Miltec, Huntsville, AL
Dr. Stephen B. Johnson, Jacobs ESSSA Group and Univ. of Colorado, Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, CO
Jonathan T. Breckenrdige, Jacobs ESSSA Group, Ducommun Miltec, Huntsville, AL
The work described here was performed on the NASA SLSP under contract NNM12AA41C
Presentation to the 
2014 IEEE International Conference on Prognostics and Health Management
Eastern Washington University
Spokane, Washington. June 22- 25, 2014
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140011781 2019-08-31T19:21:00+00:00Z
www.nasa.gov/sls
Outline
 Simplified Fault Management (FM) 
 Application of System Health Management (SHM) theory for 
NASA Space Launch System (SLS) Abort System
 What are Launch Vehicle Abort Triggers
 Application and Example
 Limitations and Conclusions
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What is System Health Management
 SHM addresses activities that are described under several 
names: 
• Prognostics and Health Management
• Fault Protection
• Vehicle Health Monitoring and/or Management
• Fault Detection, Isolation and Response (FDIR)
• Diagnostics, Maintainability, Reliability, and Availability 
 Historically ad hoc set of processes and technologies that aim to 
predict, detect, diagnose, and response to failures
 Basis for unified theory of SHM goes back nearly 20 years, and 
this theory provides the conceptual framework for the field and 
operational subset, Fault Management
• FM theory can be considered as an extension of control theory [FM Control 
Loop (FMCL) Theory]
 Purpose of SHM is to “Preserve the system’s ability to function 
as intended”
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Fault Management Functions as
State Estimation and Control
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Applying SHM Theory to SLS Abort 
Detection and Response Logic
 Most crew threatening failures result in: 
• Launch vehicle explosions or loss of control
• Inability to achieve orbit but able to maintain attitude control
 Abort Triggers exist to enable crew escape from 
the hazard
• An abort response cannot occur unless the abort condition is 
detected
• If an abort condition is detected, the SLS can send an Abort 
Recommendation message to the MPCV, or a Warning 
message if the failure develops slowly
 Abort Triggers can be on SLS, MPCV, Launch or 
Mission Control Center, or Flight Crew
 Improvement to crew safety is measured as Loss of 
Crew (LOC) Benefit gained by adding Abort 
Triggers to the design
• LOC Benefit is the highest-level metric
• Calculated through Loss of Mission (LOM) Scenarios 
probabilities and associated Abort Effectiveness (AE) values
 Provides crucial information to…
• Assess probabilistic LOM and LOC requirements
• Risk-informed design to select abort triggers
• Develop operational procedures
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Multi-Purposed Crew 
Vehicle (MPCV):
Launch Abort System (LAS)
Orion Crew Capsule
Service Module
Core Stage:
Newly developed for SLS, 
towers more than 200 
feet tall
RS-25 Engines:
Space Shuttle engines for 
the first four flights are 
already in inventory
Solid Rocket Boosters:
Built on Space Shuttle 
hardware; more powerful
Interim Cryogenic 
Propulsion Stage:
Based on the Delta IV 
Heavy upper stage
Block I SLS 70 mT
www.nasa.gov/sls
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M&FM Abort 
Triggers Selection
New, deletion or changes to existing LOM Scenarios.
New or changes to existing Abortability Tables such 
as: ATWT range, flight termination system delay time, 
and changes in failure scenarios.
GN&C AE estimates for vehicle Loss of Control 
Scenarios.
Percent vehicle thrust vector control failures that 
can be successfully controlled and lead to mission 
success. SLS GN&C provides inputs to PRA prior to 
LOM Scenarios delivery to M&FM.
Structures and Environments (STE) Abortability Tables 
are associated with SLS vehicle explosion cases, 
such as CSE explosion.
AE lookup as a function of ATWT, Abort Trigger, 
Abortability Table and mission phase.
AE values for each LOM Scenario-mission phase 
combination for inputs into PRA software to 
calculate official LOC and inputs into Cross-Program 
PRA model.
AE and LOC Benefit values are used by M&FM to 
assess Abort Trigger Effectiveness, 
recommendations for new or removal of Abort 
Trigger, and Abort Trigger designs.
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ATWT: Abortability Table Warning Time AE: Abort Effectiveness 
M&FM: Mission & Fault Management VBA: Visual Basic for Application
SLS Abort Trigger Analysis Approach
Feedback from Previous 
Abort Analysis
SLS GN&C Abort Triggers 
Monte Carlo Simulations
SLS STE
Abortability 
Tables
PRA LOM Scenarios 
Probabilities and Cut Sets
LOM Scenarios Review by 
M&FM and Domain Experts
Execute 
AE 
Lookup 
Excel 
VBA 
Script
Determine For Each LOM Scenario:
• Applicable Abort Triggers and 
Percent  Coverage
• Best Match Abortability Table
• ATWT for each Abort Trigger
M&FM Abort Analysis Results
Format AE Results 
for PRA
Populate Abort Analysis Matrix
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Example of Abort Analysis Matrix’s
Logic Flow Diagram
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LOM 
Scenario
Primary 
Trigger #1
LOC (1.0 ) [AE]
Secondary 
Trigger #2
Secondary
Trigger #1
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMS, ATWT, Abortability Table
LOC Benefit (1.1)
LOC (1.1 ) [AE]
FN
Abortability Table wrt LOMS
ATWT wrt LOMS & Trigger 1.0
LOC Benefit (1.0)
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMS, ATWT, Abortability Table
Abortability Table wrt LOMSx
ATWT wrt LOMS & Trigger 1.1
FN
FN
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMS, ATWT, Abortability Table
Abortability Table wrt LOMS
ATWT wrt LOMS & Trigger 1.2
LOC (1.1 ) [FN]
LOC (1.2 ) [FN]
LOC Benefit (1.2 
)
LOC (1.2 ) [AE]
Primary 
Trigger #2
ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ು.భ
ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ು.మ
ܮܱܯ்
ܨܰ%ು.భ ܨܰ%ೄ.భ
TP
ܨܰ%ೄ.మ
TP
TP
ܣܧ%ು.భ
ܣܧ%ೄ.భ
ܣܧ%ೄ.మ
ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ೄ.భ
ܵ݌݈݅ݐ%ೄ.మ
ܮܱܯ்௉భ
Equations can be found in the submitted paper
AE: Abort Effectiveness ATWT: Abortability Table Warning Time
FN: False Negative LOMS: Loss of Mission Scenario
TP: True Positive wrt: With respect to
(1.1) means primary trigger #1 and secondary trigger #1
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Example Calculation
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 Prob. LOM = 1E-05 per mission
 Two primary triggers, P1 and P2, 
and one secondary trigger, S1
 Point estimates shown
 AE is estimated with respect to LOM 
scenario, trigger, ATWT and 
abortability table type
TRIGGERS
Parameter P1 P2 S1
Trigger Coverage % 80% 20% 100%
False Negative 5% 5% 1%
ATWT (ms) 0 -500 -800
AE (%) 90% 40% 10%
LOM 
Scenario
Primary 
Trigger #1
LOC (1.0 ) [AE]
Secondary
Trigger #1
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMSx, ATWT, Abortability Table
LOC Benefit (1.1)
LOC (1.1 ) [AE]
FN
Abortability Table wrt LOMSx
ATWT (0 msec)  for Trigger 1.0
LOC Benefit (1.0)
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMSx, ATWT, Abortability Table
Abortability Table wrt LOMSx
ATWT (-500 msec)  for Trigger 1.1
FN LOC (1.1 ) [FN]
= 80%
=1E-5
= 5%
=1%
TP
TP
Primary 
Trigger #2
LOC (2.0 ) [AE]
Abort Effectiveness
wrt LOMSx, ATWT, Abortability Table
Abortability Table wrt LOMSx
ATWT wrt LOMSx & Trigger 2.1
LOC Benefit (2.0)
TP
ൌ	40%
Secondary
Trigger #1
LOC Benefit (2.1)
LOC (2.1 ) [AE]
FN Abort Effectivenesswrt LOMSx, ATWT, Abortability Table
Abortability Table wrt LOMSx
ATWT (-800 msec)  for Trigger 2.1
FN LOC (2.1 ) [FN]
TP
= 5%
95%
95%
99%
LOM Scenario Abort 
Effectiveness ~ 76.5% for 
the example abort trigger 
suite
LOC Benefit ~ 7.7E-06
LOM = 1E-05
LOC =  2.4E-06
ATWT: Abortability Table Warning Time
AE: Abort Effectiveness 
FN: False Negative
TP: True Positive
wrt: With respect to
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Value of LOC Benefit Calculation
 Represents the value of FM to mitigate potential, impending, and 
actual failures that threaten human safety
• Value of these FMCLs depend on the probability of the failures that they mitigate
 Useful in a comparative sense to assess different potential FM 
detections & responses
 Example, assume that the probability of achieving orbit is 90% (or 
Prob. LOM = 10%)
• If no abort action occurs, then LOM = LOC
• If LOC requirement is set at 1% per mission, then Abort Triggers and abort 
responses must reduce the LOC accordingly
• The difference between these values is the required amount of LOC Benefit that 
must be provided
• Abort Triggers are worthwhile only if they provide “significant” value in driving 
LOC down to the required level
 It is necessary to also estimate costs, such as the actual monetary 
and schedule costs to allow Program Managers to make informed 
decision
2014 IEEE PHM. 9
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Key Limitations
 Capturing and propagation of uncertainties
• Each group performed their own calculations with their own uncertainties and 
assumptions; difficult to integrate them all
• In M&FM, used Worst-on-Worst, Best-on-Best bounding instead of Monte 
Carlo Simulations
 Several SLS groups already performed analyses that generated 
data similar to what was ultimately needed to perform the Abort 
Trigger Analysis
• S&MA PRA
‒M&FM required more detail for some failure scenarios than PRA would otherwise 
have generated
• GN&C analyses of GN&C Abort Triggers already existed
‒M&FM provided better framework to incorporate and interpret the data
• STE already performed blast overpressure, debris and fireball analyses
‒M&FM provided inputs to STE to define needed analyses, and to define the 
structure for inputs to (warning times, phases, time steps and bounds), and outputs 
from (“abortability” / survivability) STE
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Conclusions
 SHM/FM theory has been successfully applied to the selection of the 
baseline set Abort Triggers for the NASA SLS
• Quantitative assessment played a useful role in the decision process
 M&FM, which is new within NASA MSFC, required the most “new” 
work, as this quantitative analysis had never been done before
• Required development of the methodology and tool to mechanize the process
• Established new relationships to the other groups
 The process is now an accepted part of the SLS design process, and 
will likely be applied to similar programs in the future at NASA MSFC
 Future improvements 
• Improve technical accuracy
‒Differentiate crew survivability due to an abort, vs. survivability even no immediate abort 
occurs (small explosion with little debris)
‒Account for contingent dependence of secondary triggers on primary triggers
‒Allocate “∆ LOC Benefit” of each trigger when added to the previously selected triggers.
• Reduce future costs through the development of a specialized tool
 Methodology can be applied to any manned/unmanned vehicle, in 
space or terrestrial
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Thank You and Finally…
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SLS is the 
first step 
in the 
journey 
to Mars
8482 HAL5 .13
Going to Mars will be difficult.
SLS provides the power that it takes.
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The Path To Mars
Going 
out 
there to 
better 
life here
We explore space to promote 
inspiration, security, diplomacy,
knowledge, technology & prosperity.
www.nasa.gov/sls
www.twitter.com/nasa_sls
www.facebook.com/nasasls
Join us on
the journey
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